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Death is the whole ball game
by Jeffrey Fagan, James S. Liebman, and Valerie West

invalidates the conceptual basis of
their own study.
Most crucially, Latzer and
Cauthen fail to understand that the
law treats a state's decision to take
life as more serious than any other

trial decision. They regard trial error that spells the difference between an individual's living and dying as unimportant and consign it
to a lower status than, for example,
error leading to convictions of one
degree of homicide rather than
another.
As a statement of Latzer and
Cauthen's beliefs, this conclusion is
merely idiosyncratic; most Americans disagree. But as a statement of
the premises of our actual death
penalty system-and, thus, of what
to measure when assessing that
system's effectiveness-their claim
is dead wrong. A large body of law
holds that "death is different," and
that flaws in all other aspects of the
criminal justice system pale in comparison to mistakes in meting out
that punishment.' Death is not just
the extra point after a touchdown.
It's the whole ball game.
Latzer and Cauthen also misunderstand how the law aims to get
capital sentences right. They assume the law requires only two
findings for a death sentence-that
the defendant is guilty of a "capital
offense" (a decision they call "the
conviction" and assume occurs entirely at the first phase of capital trials), and that the aggravating
factors in the case outweigh the
mitigating ones (a decision they
call "the sentence" and assume is
the only one made at the second
phase). They then assert that the
first of these decisions is important
because it measures culpability,
while the second decision is unimportant and beneath policy concern.
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The Meaning of Capital Appeals,
n Capital
Appeals
and
Barry
Latzer
and Revisited
James N.G.
Cauthen argue that a study of capital
appeals should focus only on overturned findings of guilt, and complain that in A Broken System we examine all overturned capital verdicts.
But the question they want studied
cannot provide an accurate evaluation of a system of capital punishment.
By proposing to count only "conviction" error and not "sentence" error,
Latzer and Cauthen ignore that if a
death sentence is overturned, the
case is no longer capital and the system of capital punishment has failed
to achieve its central objective.
Latzer and Cauthen's failure to recognize this point illustrates their basic misunderstanding of the legal
process. That misunderstanding not
only leads them to misinterpret our
work and to advance misleading conclusions about the functionality of
the death penalty in the U.S., but also
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The law
The law states otherwise. Latzer and
Cauthen ignore the fact that state
and federal law generally requires
states to prove four things before imposing a death sentence. The defendant must be guilty of (1) homicide
(unjustified killing of another person), (2) additional acts making the
killing murder of the first degree (e.g.,
a premeditated or deliberate killing),
and (3) at least one statutory aggravating act that makes the murder
capital. Only if these findings are
made does the issue become the one
Latzer and Cauthen say is unimportant: (4) whether aggravating factors
outweigh mitigating ones. Latzer
and Cauthen's two categories of error-"conviction" (first-phase) and
"sentencing" (second-phase) errorthus are useless for studying a system
3
that recognizes four types of error.
Latzer and Cauthen also ignore
the interdependence of the process
for determining these four things.
Some states allocate at least some aspects of finding (2) to the second
trial phase. All but a couple states allocate finding (3) to the second stage.4
So, when Latzer and Cauthen count
only first-phase reversals as important, they miss many mistakes impugning findings that defendants
1. Liebman, Fagan, and West, A Broken System:
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-95, http://
www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/
liebman/liebmanfinal.pdf, visited October 13,

2000.
2. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
253 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201, 3913-202, 39-13-204 (Supp. 1999).
4. For example, Florida and Texas assign premeditation and deliberation determinations,
and all aggravating circumstance questions, to
the second, so-called "sentencing" phase.

committed a high degree of murder
that was capitally aggravated. These
mistakes go directly to culpability, as
Latzer and Cauthen themselves admit by counting them as "important"
when they occur at the first phase.
Latzer and Cauthen don't understand that many first-phase (so-called
"conviction") and second-phase
("sentencing") errors are the same,

tify any different legal threshold or
scrutiny that accounts for high reversal rates.
Moreover, the reversals we counted
are hardly for technicalities, and certainly meet this difficult threshold
for reversal. At the state post-conviction stage, where data are available,
75 percent of the post-reversal retrials replaced a death sentence with a
lesser sentence once the error was
cured; 7 percent more ended in acquittals.Far from being unimportant,
therefore, curing capital sentencing
error as we define it very often reveals that the defendant is not capitally culpable, and sometimes reveals
that he is not guilty at all.

our 40 cases is unrepresentative of the
skew in the many other cases they
omitted.
Second, Latzer and Cauthen say
that some of the 40 cases we identified were "mere" intermediate court
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reversals, which they didn't bother to

count. This admits another legal mistake. They think state intermediate
court decisions never reflect the state
crucial, culpability-affecting errors. Or,
courts' final judgment about the vathey artifactually depress their count
lidity of death verdicts. In fact, the
of "important" error by omitting the
law of three high capital-sentencing
large amount of it occurring at the
states gives intermediate courts the
second phase.
duty to make final rulings on the vaThey also don't recognize that the
lidity of some or all capital verdicts
fourth factor-whether aggravating
(as occurred in all the intermediate
factors are outweighed by mitigating
court decisions in the 40 we found).
ones-is no less determinative of culThus, in addition to systematically
pability than findings (1) through Two crucial points
under-sampling "conviction" rever(3). Latzer and Cauthen have no basis Latzer and Cauthen use a biased sals, Latzer and Cauthen arbitrarily
in law for treating serious mistakes search technique designed to find all omitted large chunks of final state
that compromise the balancing of errors affecting death "sentences" court cases from the universe they
mitigating and aggravating factors as and "penalties," but to underestimate sampled.
unimportant.
(because they didn't even search for)
Latzer and Cauthen's most flagrant
errors affecting capital convictions. error is one of logic. They say a 68
The same threshold
We showed that their method in fact percent rate of death sentence reverLatzer and Cauthen do assert that undercounts so-called "conviction re- sals has "nothing to do with" the relideath makes one kind of legal differ- versals" by quickly identifying 40 ability of the verdicts by which "perence. They say: "[I]n death cases, er- cases their search method misses, sons [are] selected for execution,"
rors ordinarily considered harmless and finding that 83 percent of those because those whose sentences are reare treated more seriously because missed cases were conviction reversals. versed don't get executed. Suppose
the defendant's life is on the line. In reply, they obfuscate two crucial we learn that 68 percent of Ford ExThis lowered threshold for capital points.
plorers fail the manufacturer's safety
trial reversals is a virtual mandate of
First, they claim that the 40 cases we inspections and have to be scrapped
the Supreme Court. . . . [T]he identified are small in number com- or retooled, as do 68 percent of
ground rules of review are different pared to the 837 cases they sampled. Firestone tires, 68 percent of ValueJet
and the scrutiny more intensive." But But in A Broken System we studied more aircraft, and 68 percent of Swift Packthis is wrong. Prisoners on death row than 2,100 state court reversals. Latzer ing Co.'s hamburgers checked for
have repeatedly asked the Supreme and Cauthen "sampled" only 837 re- E.coli. Latzer and Cauthen say regulaCourt to mandate a lower threshold versals. The question, then, is tors would be crazy to raise an alarm,
for reversals and to undertake a dif- whether their facially skewed sam- or to scrutinize or shut down the relferent, more intensive level of scru- pling technique-which searched a evant plants until finding out why they
tiny for the vast majority of claims computerized data base for "death produce more duds than safe prodthat are raised, and that lead to rever- penalty" and "death sentence" reversals ucts, and whether their inspectors can
sals, in capital cases. And the Su- but did not search it for "conviction" or catch all the death traps before any
preme Court has repeatedly de- "first-degree"or "aggravatingfactor' re- reach the public. If that's what Latzer
clined, applying the same standard versals-produced a skewed compari- and Cauthen think, they are free to
for deciding whether any error is son of the number of each kind of re- drive to the airport in a Ford Explorer
"harmless," the same threshold for re- versal. The 40 cases we found in a with Firestone tires, take a Value Jet
versal, and the same scrutiny, in capi- quick search for the hundreds they flight, and eat a hamburger on board.
tal as in noncapital cases.5 Latzer and omitted show they missed four convic- Forgive the rest of us, however, for exCauthen have not, and cannot, iden- tion reversals for every one sentencing ercising more prudence when life is at
reversal. Latzer and Cauthen's de- stake. vi
5. See, e.g., Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141
fense to biasing their sample thus can(1998) (harmless error); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419 (1995) (prosecutorial misconduct); Boyde v.
not be that 40 is less than 837, but
California,494 U.S. 370 (1990) (misinstruction);
could only be an argument they don't
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (incompetent counsel).
make: that the 4-to-i skew revealed by

